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Abstract
Sensitive inferences and user re-identification are major threats to privacy when
raw sensor data from wearable or portable devices are shared with cloud-assisted
applications. To mitigate these threats, we propose mechanisms to transform
sensor data before sharing them with applications running on users’ devices.
These transformations aim at eliminating patterns that can be used for user re-
identification or for inferring potentially sensitive activities, while introducing a
minor utility loss for the target application (or task). We show that, on gesture
and activity recognition tasks, we can prevent inference of potentially sensitive
activities while keeping the reduction in recognition accuracy of non-sensitive
activities to less than 5 percentage points. We also show that we can reduce
the accuracy of user re-identification and of the potential inference of gender to
the level of a random guess, while keeping the accuracy of activity recognition
comparable to that obtained on the original data.
1. Introduction
Sensors such as accelerometer, gyroscope, and magnetometer, embedded in
personal smart devices generate data that can be used to monitor users’ activities,
interactions, and mood [1, 2, 3]. Applications (apps) installed on smart devices
can get access to raw sensor data to make required (i.e. desired) inferences for
tasks such as gesture or activity recognition. However, sensor data can also
facilitate some potentially sensitive (i.e. undesired) inferences that a user might
wish to keep private, such as discovering smoking habits [4] or revealing personal
attributes such as age and gender [5]. Some patterns in raw sensor data may also
enable user re-identification [6].
Information privacy can be defined as “the right to select what personal in-
formation about me is known to what people” [7]. To preserve privacy, we need
mechanisms to control the type and amount of information that providers of
cloud-assisted apps can discover from sensor data. The main objective is to move
1Accepted to appear in Pervasive and Mobile computing (PMC) Journal, Elsevier.
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Figure 1: (Top) the data flows in the compound framework. At the test-time, first RAE auto-
matically replaces sensitive time-windows with non-sensitive neutral data, while required time-
windows are passed with minimal distortions. Then, AEE transforms data to reduce the chance
of user re-identification. (Bottom) visual illustration of our transformation mechanism. Depicted
signals show accelerometer data transformation for standing, walking, and jogging activities re-
spectively as neutral, required, and sensitive inferences (from experiment of Section 4.3).
from the current binary setting of granting or not sensor permission to an app,
toward a model that allows users to grant each app permission over a controlled
range of inferences according to the target task. The challenging task is to design
a mechanism with an acceptable trade-off between the protection of sensitive in-
formation and the maintenance of the required information for an inference [8].
To this end, we use neutral inferences that are irrelevant to the target task and
not critical to the user’s privacy.
As specific example of categorization of sensitive, required, and neutral in-
formation, let us consider a smartwatch step-counter app: required information
is essential for the app’s utility, such as walking or stair stepping; sensitive in-
formation is about activities a user wishes to keep private, such as smoking or
typing on a keyboard, or information such as gender; whereas neutral informa-
tion leads to inferences that are neither required nor sensitive, such as when
the user sits or stands. Note that two types of information (i.e. required and
sensitive, or neutral and sensitive) are sometimes entangled in the data of the
same temporal window of sensor measurements. While locally differentially pri-
vate mechanisms [9] provide plausible deniability guarantees when estimating,
for example, the mean or frequency of a common variable among users [10], with
multi-dimensional data released sequentially a more practical privacy model is in-
ferential privacy [11, 12, 13] that measures the difference between an adversary’s
belief about sensitive inferences before and after observing the released data.
We assume the app provider is honest in stating its required inferences that
need to be made on the data, but it is also curious about making other unstated
inferences that may reveal sensitive information and thus violate privacy. We
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define utility as the accuracy in making the required inferences on the released
data, and privacy loss as the accuracy in making sensitive inferences. We define
the app provider as adversary and quantify the privacy loss as the improvement
in the adversary’s posterior belief on making a sensitive inference by observing
the data. Our proposed mechanisms aim to minimize the privacy loss while
maintaining the utility of the raw data.
In this paper, we present mechanisms for transforming time-windows of sen-
sor data to preserve privacy and utility during information disclosure [14, 15, 16]
to a honest-but-curious app running on users’ devices. Specifically, we intro-
duce a Replacement AutoEncoder (RAE) to protect sensitive inferences and an
Anonymizing AutoEncoder (AAE) to prevent user re-identification, as well as
a compound architecture by cascading the RAE and AAE (see Figure 1). The
RAE and AAE can be deployed as interface into the devices’ operating system
to enable users to choose whether to share their sensor data with an app directly
or after transformations. To validate our mechanisms, in addition to using avail-
able datasets, we collected a dataset of activity recognition using smartphone
sensors, which is made publicly available2. Experiments on gesture and activity
recognition show that the RAE substantially reduces the privacy loss for sensi-
tive gestures or activities while limiting the reduction in the utility of the required
and neutral gestures or activities to less than 5 percentage points. Furthermore,
results on an activity recognition dataset of 24 users show a promising trade-off,
with the utility maintained over 92% and a reduction of the privacy loss in user
re-identification to less than 7% , from an initial 96% on the raw data. We also
show that our mechanisms lead to models that can generalize across datasets and
can be applied to new data of unseen users.
2. Related Work
Privacy-preserving mechanisms for time-series data can be implemented through
perturbations, synthesis, filtering, or transformations.
Mechanisms using perturbations hide sensitive patterns by adding a crafted
noise to each time-window of the time-series. The objective is to prevent per-
turbed data from including sufficient information to accurately reconstruct the
original data [17]. Because an independent and identically distributed noise can
be easily removed from correlated time-series [18], to reduce the risk of infor-
mation leakage, the correlation between noise and original time-series should be
indistinguishable [19]. For multi-dimensional sensor data, it is not easy to find
a reliable model of correlation between the original data and an adequate noise.
Hence, when general time-series perturbation approaches are extended to sen-
sor data, effectively hiding sensitive patterns without excessively perturbing the
non-sensitive ones is very challenging.
2Code and data are available at: https://github.com/mmalekzadeh/motion-sense
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Table 1: Privacy-preserving mechanisms for sharing time series. Key - Local: applied on the user
side (instead of being done globally by a data curator); GesAct: hides users’ sensitive gestures or
activities; Identity: prevents user re-identification; Sensors: evaluated on sensor data; Unseen:
can be used for data of users who did not contribute training data.
Mechanism Reference Local GesAct Identity Sensor Unseen
Perturbations [17, 18, 19] X X
Synthesis [22, 24, 25] X
Filtering
[26, 30, 33] X X
[27] X X X
Transformations
[12, 13] X X
[11, 31] X X
[29] X X X X
Filtering & Transformations Ours X X X X X
Data can also be synthesized to maintain some required statistics of the orig-
inal data without information that can be used for re-identification. Adversarial
learning enables one to approximate an underlying distribution to generate new
data that are similar to the existing ones [20, 21]. To provide a privacy guarantee,
generators can be trained under the constraint of differential privacy [22, 23] or
with constraints on the type of information that should be unsynthesized in the
data [24]. However, these mechanisms are used for offline dataset publishing by
a data aggregator [25], not for online data transformation at the user side.
Filtering can be used to remove unwanted components only in temporal inter-
vals that include sensitive information. MaskIt [26] releases location time-series
when users are at a regular workplace and suppresses them when they are in a
sensitive place, such as a hospital. A Markov chain built on a pre-defined set of
conditions is employed for each user. A Dynamic Bayesian Network model can
be used offline to replace sensitive time-windows that indicate users’ stress, while
keeping non-sensitive time-windows corresponding to their walking periods [27].
Transformations can reduce the amount of sensitive information in the data
by reconstruction [12] or by projecting each data sample into a lower dimensional
latent representation [13, 28]. The information bottleneck in the hidden layers
of neural networks helps to capture the main factors of variation in the data
and to identify and obscure sensitive patterns in the latent representation [13],
as well as during the reconstruction from the extracted low-dimensional repre-
sentation [29, 30]. Global mechanisms involve a trusted data curator and, based
on the information bottleneck principle, compress sensor data to reduce sensitive
information that is irrelevant to the main task [11].
Table 1 compares methods related to our work. A privacy-preserving mech-
anism can be run globally or locally. Global mechanisms involve a trusted data
curator that has access to the original data and offer a data transformation service
to remove sensitive information before data publishing [11, 31, 32]. Local mech-
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Table 2: Main notation used in this paper.
xsj ∈ R reading from sensor component s at sampling instant j;
X ∈ RM×W time-window of W samples from M sensors;
X i,X o ⊆ RM×W input and output datasets, respectively, for training the RAE;
X′, X′′ ∈ RM×W output of the RAE and the AAE, respectively;
U ∈ {0, 1}N N -dim vector representing the identity of a user (∑Ni=1 ui = 1);
Y ∈ {0, 1}B B-dim vector representing a gesture/activity (∑Bi=1 yi = 1);
I(·; ·) mutual information function;
d(·, ·) distance function between two time-series (e.g. Mean Squared Error).
anisms, instead, manipulate data at the user side, without relying on a trusted
curator [26, 29, 30]. Our mechanisms run locally and can be used by users who
did not contribute training data (unseen users).
3. Sensor-Data Transformation
We first introduce the Replacement AutoEncoder (RAE) that protects sen-
sitive inferences, then we present the Anonymizing AutoEncoder (AAE) that
prevents user re-identification. The notations we use in this paper are shown in
Table 2.
3.1. Replacement AutoEncoder
Deep neural networks (DNNs) are powerful machine learning algorithms that
progressively learn hierarchical and relevant representations of their training data.
Earlier layers of a DNN can encode generic low-level data patterns and later layers
can capture more specific high-level features. Autoencoders learn features from
data through minimizing the differences (e.g. mean squared error or cross entropy)
between the input and its reconstruction. The information bottleneck [34] in the
hidden layers forces an autoencoder to put more attention on the descriptive data
patterns in order to generalize the model.
Let a fixed-length time-window of sensor data, X = (xsj) ∈ RM×W , contain
some specific patterns that are utilized to recognize the gesture or activity of
the user at that specific time-point. For example, let us consider an smartwatch
app which counts users’ daily steps. Users may want this app to only be able to
infer activities that are required for step counting task, not other activities such
as smoking or eating that may be considered sensitive. The main idea of RAE
is to automatically recognize and replace each time-widows that reveals sensitive
activities with a same dimension data that simulates a neutral activity, such as
standing or sitting, which does not affect the step counter utility.
Let the training dataset include labeled sample time-windows, each belonging
to one of the following categories: required, sensitive, or neutral. Let X i be
5
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Figure 2: Circles represent time-windows in the input (X i) and output (X o) datasets for
training the RAE. We first make a copy of the original input dataset and replace every sensitive
time-window with a randomly chosen neutral one to prepare the output dataset for training the
RAE. Then, the RAE is trained to transform each Xi to the corresponding Xo. At inference
time, RAE can replace unseen sensitive time-windows with data that simulates neutral ones.
the input dataset and X o be the output dataset, with a one-to-one relationship
between each Xi ∈ X i and an Xo ∈ X o explained in Figure 2. Basically, data
samples of sensitive classes in X i are randomly replaced with data samples from
one of the neutral classes to build X o. Therefore X o contains only samples from
the required and neutral classes. The RAE is then trained to transform each Xi
to the corresponding Xo, subject to a loss function, LR(X
i,Xo), which calculates
the difference between the input of the RAE and its corresponding output.
Let a replacement be defined as privacy-preserving if its outcome removes,
or practically bounds, the possibility of revealing sensitive inferences. If Xr is a
privacy-preserving replacement for sensitive data X, the RAE aims to implement
the following operation:
X′ = RAE(X) =
Xr if X reveals a sensitive inference,X otherwise, (1)
where the privacy loss of the replaced data, X′, is equivalent to the amount of
sensitive information it reveals. If R(X; θ) is an autoencoder with parameter
set θ ∈ Θ, and LR(·, ·) is the autoencoder’s loss function, we define the optimal
parameter set for the RAE as
θ∗ = argmin
θ∈Θ
LR
(
R
(
X i; θ
)
,X o
)
, (2)
which can be achieved through a neural network optimization process [35]. The
implementation details of RAE are explained in Section 4.
3.2. Anonymization AutoEncoder
As time-windows that do not reveal sensitive inferences are supposed to pass
through the RAE with minimum distortion, they may be used for other malicious
purposes such as user re-identification. As a motivational example, consider
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participants in a study for a new treatment who share their daily sensor data
with researchers [36]. These participants may want to minimize the risk of being
re-identified by those who will access their released data. Therefore, their sensor
data should be released in a way that the required information for the medical
study, such as patients daily activities, can be accurately inferred, while other
motion patterns that facilitate user re-identification are obscured.
We define the data with the user’s identifiable information obscured as the
anonymized sensor data, X′′. Considering A(·) as a potential data transformation
function and X the data we want to anonymize, we define the fitness function
F(.) as
F
(
A (X)
)
= βiI
(
U; A (X)
)− βaI (Y; A (X))+ βdd (X,A (X)) , (3)
where the non-negative, real-valued weights βi, βa and βd determine the trade-
off between privacy loss and utility. As it is discussed in Section 4, the desired
trade-off is established through cross validation over the training dataset.
Let the anonymization function, A(·), that transforms X into X′′ be
A (X) = argmin
A(X)
F
(
A (X)
)
. (4)
The threefold objective of Eq. (3) is to minimize I
(
U;A (X)), the mutual infor-
mation between the random variable that specifies the identity of current user
and the anonymized data; to maximize I
(
Y; A (X)
)
, the mutual information be-
tween the random variable that captures the user activity and the anonymized
data (i.e. to minimize its negative value); and, to avoid large data distortions by
minimizing d
(
X,A (X)
)
, the distance between raw and anonymized data.
As we cannot practically search over all possible transformation functions,
we consider a DNN and look for the optimal parameter set through training.
To approximate the required mutual information terms, we reformulate the op-
timization problem in Eq. (4) as a DNN optimization problem. Let A(X; θ) be a
DNN, where θ is the parameter set of the DNN. The network optimizer finds the
optimal parameter set θ∗ by searching the space of all possible parameter sets,
Θ, as:
θ∗ = argmin
θ∈Θ
βiI
(
U; A (X; θ)
)− βaI (Y; A (X; θ))+ βdd (X,A (X; θ)) , (5)
where A(·; θ∗) is the optimal data anonymizer for a general A(·) in Eq. (4).
Again, we can obtain θ∗ using a stochastic optimization algorithm [37]. A key
contributor to the AAE training is the following multi-objective loss function,
LA, which implements the fitness function F
(
A (x)
)
of Eq. (4):
LA = βiLi − βaLa + βdLd, (6)
where La and Ld are utility losses that can be customized based on the target
task requirements, whereas Li is a privacy loss that helps the AAE remove user-
specific patterns that facilitate user re-identification.
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Practically, the categorical cross-entropy loss function for classification, La =
Y log(Yˆ), aims to preserve activity-specific patterns, where Yˆ, the output of a
softmax function, is a B-dimensional vector of probabilities for the prediction
of the activity label. To tune the desired privacy-utility trade-off, the distance
function that controls the amount of distortion, Ld, forces X
′′ to be as similar as
possible to the input X:
Ld =
1
M ×W
M∑
s=1
W∑
j=1
(xsj − x′′sj)2. (7)
Finally, the privacy loss, Li, the most important term of our multi-objective loss
function that aims to minimize sensitive information in the data, is defined as:
Li = −
(
U · log
(
1N − Uˆ
)
+ log
(
1−max
(
Uˆ
)))
, (8)
where N is the number of users in the training set, 1N is the all-one column
vector of length N , U is the true identity label for X, and Uˆ is the output of
the softmax function, the N -dimensional vector of probabilities learned by the
classifier (i.e. the probability of each user label, given the input). U · log(1N −Uˆ)
is dot product of row vectors.
The goal of training AAE is to minimize the privacy loss by minimizing the
amount of information leakage from U to X′′. Hence, we use adversarial training
to approximate the mutual information by estimating the posterior distribution
of the sensitive data given the released data [38].
4. Evaluation
To evaluate the RAE, we use four benchmark datasets of gesture and activity
recognition including at least 10 different labels: Opportunity [39], Skoda [40],
Hand-Gesture [41], and Utwente [42]. To evaluate the AAE, we need a dataset
containing several users to show how we can hide users’ gender or identity. There-
fore, we use MotionSense [43] that contains the collected data of 24 users in a
range of gender, age, and height who performed 6 activities. We also evaluate
the compound architecture (RAE+AAE) on a case study using the MotionSense
dataset.
Opportunity [39] is composed of the collected data of 4 users and there are 18
gestures classes. Each record in this dataset comprises 113 sensory readings from
various types of body-worn sensors like accelerometer, gyroscope, magnetometer,
and skin temperature.
Skoda [40] is collected by an assembly-line worker in a car production company
wearing 19 accelerometer sensors on his right and left arm and performing a set
of pre-specified experiments.
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Hand-Gesture [41] includes data from accelerometer and gyroscope sensors
attached to the upper and lower arm. There are two users performing 12 classes of
hand movements. Each record in this dataset has 15 real-valued sensor readings.
Utwente [42] includes the data of 6 participants performing several activities,
including potentially sensitive smoking activity, while wearing a smart-phone on
their wrist. Accelerometer, gyroscope, and magnetometer data are collected. The
whole dataset is publicly available in a single file with activity labels only.
MotionSense [43] is collected with a smart-phone kept in the users’ front
pocket. A total of 24 users performed 6 activities in 15 trials in the same envi-
ronment and conditions. It includes acceleration, rotation, gravity, and attitude
data. Each record in this dataset includes 12 real-valued sensor readings.
Table 3 summarizes the gesture/activity classes of the five datasets. For
Opportunity, we use four trials as the training data, and consider the last trial as
the testing data. For other datasets, we consider 80% of the data as the training
set and the rest as the testing set. The null class in the gesture datasets refers to
data that cannot be mapped to a known behavior. All the gesture datasets are
resampled to 30Hz sampling rate.
4.1. Replacement
Let the B classes of inference, I = {I1, ..., Ii, ..., Ij , ..., IB}, be divided into
three categories: (i) Required, R = {I1, ..., Ii}, (ii) Sensitive, S = {Ii+1, ..., Ij},
and (iii) Neutral, N = {Ij+1, ..., IB}. Considering a target app and its potential
users, we assume S is the set of inferences that users wish to keep private. We
assume these are sufficiently sensitive that the user would wish to prevent the
app from making any inferences within this set. Moreover, R is the set of required
inferences that users gain utility from if the app can accurately infer them. Fi-
nally, N is the set of neutral inferences that are not sensitive to users that these
inferences can be made by the app and it is also not useful for gaining utility.
We assume these lists are available to the RAE for its training.
4.1.A. Gesture Datasets
Here, we implemented RAE with the following settings. Seven fully-connected
layers with size (number of neurons) inp = (M × W ), inp2 , inp8 , inp16 , inp8 , inp2 ,
out = inp, respectively (except for the Hand-Gesture dataset with a lower di-
mensionality that the three middle layers are inp3 ,
inp
4 ,
inp
3 ). For all datasets, we
consider 1 second time-window, W = 30. All the experiments are performed on
30 epochs with batch size 128. The activation function for the output layer is
linear and for the input and all of the hidden layers is Scaled Exponential Linear
Unit [44]. In our experiments, to retain the overall structure of the reconstructed
data, we set LR in Eq. (2) as the point-wise mean square error function.
To evaluate the privacy loss and utility of the RAE’s outcomes, both the
raw sensor data and the transformed data are given to a DNN classifier, as an
envisioned app, and F1− score are calculated in Table 4, Table 5, and Table 6.
Here we use F1− score as evaluation metric because it takes both false positives
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Table 3: Gesture/Activity classes and properties of each dataset used for evaluation.
Gesture Datasets Activity Datasets
# Opportunity Skoda HandGesture Utwente MotionSense
0 null null null — —
1 open door1 write notes open window walking standing
2 open door2 open hood close window jogging stairs-down
3 close door1 close hood water a plant cycling stairs-up
4 close door2 check front door turn book stairs-up walking
5 open fridge open left f door drink a bottle stairs-down jogging
6 close fridge close left f door cut w/ knife sitting
7 open washer close left doors chop w/ knife standing —
8 close washer check trunk stir in a bowl typing —
9 open drawer1 open/close trunk forehand writing —
10 close drawer1 check wheels backhand eating —
11 open drawer2 — smash smoking —
12 close drawer2 — — — —
13 open drawer3 — — — —
14 close drawer3 — — — —
15 clean table — — — —
16 drink cup — — — —
17 toggle switch — — — —
N 4 1 2 6 24
M 113 57 15 9 12
S.R. 30 Hz 30 Hz 30 Hz 50 Hz 50 Hz
and false negatives into account. For RAE, false positives (i.e. recognizing R
as S) harm the utility and false negatives (i.e. recognizing S as R or N ) harm
privacy. It should be noted that the classification accuracy metric also shows
similar patterns3.
The results show that utility is preserved for non-sensitive, R and N , classes
while recognizing sensitive ones, S, is very unlikely. Moreover, Figure 3 shows
that the model misclassifies all transformed sections corresponding to S into the
N and therefore the false-positive rate on required inferences is very low. For
instance, to see how RAE can establish a good utility privacy trade-off, consider
3 Results available at: https://github.com/mmalekzadeh/replacement-autoencoder
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Table 4: Gesture recognition results (F1− score) by a pre-trained convolutional neural network
on the Skoda dataset.
# Set of Inferences X X′ # Set of Inferences X X′
R = {4, 8, 9, 10} 97.9 96.3 R = {1, 4, 10} 97.6 95.0
1 S = {1, 5, 6, 7} 96.2 0.0 3 S = {2, 3, 8, 9} 98.0 0.0
N = {0, 2, 3} 94.3 93.4 N = {0, 5, 6, 7} 92.3 88.2
R = {2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9} 96.5 93.2 R = {2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9} 95.8 91.1
2 S = {4, 8, 10} 97.9 0.0 4 S = {4, 8, 10} 97.4 0.0
N = {0, 1} 93.9 94.8 N = {0, 1} 94.3 92.4
Table 5: F1 − score for the Hand-Gesture
dataset.
# Set of Inferences X X′
R = {1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 10, 11} 94.1 90.1
1 S = {5, 6, 7, 8} 95.7 0.3
N = {0} 95.0 96.5
R = {1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7} 95.2 90.4
2 S = {2, 8, 9, 10, 11} 94.5 0.6
N = {0} 95.0 97.5
R = {1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8} 97.2 93.3
3 S = {2, 9, 10, 11} 92.5 0.7
N = {0} 95.9 97.5
R = {2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9} 96.1 92.1
4 S = {4, 8, 10} 97.0 0.5
N = {0, 1} 95.7 97.6
Table 6: F1 − score for the Opportunity
dataset.
# Set of Inferences X X′
R={9,10,...,17} 71.8 64.3
1 S={1,2,...,8} 79.1 0.2
N={0} 88.9 89.7
R={1,2,...,8,15,17} 76.9 75.9
2 S={9,10,...,14} 71.5 1.3
N={0,16} 84.4 82.1
R={9,10,...,14,16} 74.9 77.1
3 S={1,2,3,4,15,17} 76.2 0.9
N ={0,5,6,7,8} 85.0 81.6
R={1,2,...,8,15,17} 70.3 65.0
4 S={9,10,...,14,16} 74.9 6.3
N={0,1} 93.7 92.9
the results for the Skoda dataset in Table 4(#2). We see that the gesture clas-
sifier can effectively recognize R gestures (e.g. opening and closing doors), even
when the app processes the output of RAE instead of the raw data (with 93.2%
accuracy). However, S gestures (e.g. checking doors) that can be recognized
with high accuracy when app processes the raw data (with 97.9% accuracy), are
completely filtered out in the output of the RAE. Moreover, the corresponding
confusion matrix for this experiment in Figure 3 (Left-Bottom) shows that the
utility of the required inferences is preserved as the classifier wrongly infers all S
gestures as some N gestures and not as one of R gestures.
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Figure 3: Confusion Matrix for (top) original time-series, and (bottom) transformed time-series
by RAE. After transformation almost all the sensitive gestures are recognized as neutral ones.
(Left) Results on the Skoda dataset in Table 4 (#2). (Middle) Hand-Gesture dataset in Table 5
(#1). (Right) Opportunity dataset in Table 6 (#2).
4.1.B. Utwente dataset
Let S = {typing, writing, smoking, eating} be the set of sensitive inferences,
N = {sitting still, standing still} be the set of neutral inferences, and R =
{walking, jogging, cycling, stairs-up, stairs-down} be the set of required infer-
ences. Considering a 2-second time-window (W = 100), we trained an RAE with
6 hidden layers: 4 Convolutional-LSTM layers using hyperbolic tangent as the
activation function with 256, 128, 64 and 64 filters respectively, followed by 2
Convolutional layers using Scaled Exponential Linear Unit [44] as the activation
function with 64 and 128 layers respectively. We also put a batch-normalizer on
the output of each hidden layer to reduce the training time4.
To evaluate the privacy-utility trade-off, we use a DNN classifier. As we see
in Table 7, the average accuracy of the classifier on the raw data is more than
99%. However, when we feed the same classifier with the output of the RAE, all
the S activities are recognized as sitting still, while the accuracy for R activities
is almost equal to that of the raw data. We observe that for smoking there still
is a 5% chance of recognition. Note that for some time-windows of the smoking
the raw data are similar to those of standing still. This effect can be also seen
4More implementation details and codes for reproducing the results can be found at https:
//github.com/mmalekzadeh/replacement-autoencoder
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walking jogging cycling stairs-up stairs-down sitting standing typing writing eating smoking
walking 97.5 → 97.2 0.7 → 0.7 1.5 → 1.9 0.3 → 0.1
jogging 100 → 100
cycling 100 → 100
stairs-up 0.4 → 0.3 0.4 → 0.4 0.0 → 0.1 98.8 → 98.8 0.1 → 0.1 0.3 → 0.3
stairs-down 0.3 → 0.3 99.7 → 99.7
sitting 0.0 → 0.3 98.6 → 96.8 1.0 → 0.0 0.1 → 0.0 0.1 → 0.0 0.1 → 2.8
standing 0.0 → 0.3 99.4 → 98.2 0.6 → 1.5
typing 0.0 → 100 100 → 0.0
writing 0.0 → 0.7 0.0 → 99.3 99.9 → 0.0 0.1 → 0.0
eating 0.0 → 0.5 0.1 → 99.4 0.3 → 0.0 99.6 → 0.0 0.1 → 0.1
smoking 0.0 → 0.1 0.0 → 94.9 2.3 → 0.0 97.5 → 5.0
Table 7: Confusion Matrix of the results on the test data for Utwente dataset. Rows show the
true labels and columns show the predicted labels. In each cell, the left part shows the accuracy
on the raw data, and the right part shows the accuracy after transformation. For brevity, all
the values are rounded to one decimal point. Empty cells show 0.0→ 0.0.
in Table 7 (column smoking). We assume this is a labeling error when the data
curator labels intervals between cigarette drags as smoking behavior while user
is standing.
4.2. Anonymization
To evaluate the AAE as a data anonymizer, we measure the extent to which
the accuracy of activity recognition suffers from anonymization compared to
accessing the raw data. We compare the trade-off between recognizing users’
activity versus their identity, and compare with baseline methods for coarse-
grain time-series data (resampling and singular spectrum analysis) and with the
method in [13] that only considers the latent representation by the Encoder model
(see Figure 4), without taking X′′ into account.
We use resampling by Fast Fourier Transform (FFT), which is desirable for
periodic time-series, and this is typical with mobile sensor data for activity recog-
nition. Singular Spectrum Analysis (SSA) [45] is a model-free technique that
decomposes time-series into trend, periodic, and structureless (or noise) com-
ponents using singular value decomposition (SVD). In our case, we decompose
X = {X1,X2, . . . ,XD} such that the Xi and Xi+1 are arranged in descending order
according to their corresponding singular value and the original time-series can be
recovered as: X =
∑D
i=1Xi. Thus, we test the idea of incremental reconstruction
by SSA as a base-line transformation method.
We consider two methods of dividing the dataset into training and test sets,
namely Subject and Trial. For Subject, we put all data of 4 of the users in the
dataset, 2 females and 2 males, as testing data and the remaining 20 users as
training. Hence, after training the AAE, we evaluate the model on a dataset of
new unseen users. For Trial, we put one trial data of each user as testing data and
the remaining trials of that user’s data as training. For example, where we have
three walking trials for every user, we consider one trial as testing and the other
two as training. In both cases, we put 20% of the training data for validation
during the training phase. We repeat each experiment 5 times and report the
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Figure 4: Details of the training the AAE (Encoder and Decoder) for a dataset with 24 users
and 4 activities. KEY – EncReg and DecReg : users’ identity recognizers that monitors the
output of the Encoder and Decoder, respectively, to reduce the privacy loss; ActReg : a users’
activity recognizer that monitors the output of the Decoder to increase the utility.
mean and the standard deviation. For all the experiments we use the magnitude
value for both gyroscope and accelerometer.
To simplify the process of encoding data into a lower-dimensional represen-
tation and then decoding it to the original dimension with convolutional filters,
we set W to be a power of 2. The larger W, the lower the possibility of taking
advantage of the correlation among the successive windows by adversaries [38].
But larger window sizes increase the delay for real-time apps. We set W = 128
(i.e. 2.56 seconds).
For all the regularizers, EncReg, DecReg, and ActReg (see Figure 4), we use
2D convolutional neural networks. To prevent overfitting, we add a Dropout [46]
layer after each convolution layer. We also use L2 regularization to penalize
large weights. We train the classifier on the original and the anonymized training
dataset, and then use it for inference on the test data. We use the Subject setting,
thus the test data includes data of new unseen users.
To measure the utility, we train an activity recognition classifier on both the
raw data and the output of each transformation method: Resampling, SSA, [13],
and our AAE. Then, we use the trained model for inference on the corresponding
testing data. Here we use the Subject setting, thus the testing data include data
of new unseen users. The second row of Table 8 (ACT) shows that the average
accuracy for activity recognition for both Raw and AAE data is around 92%.
Compared to other methods that decrease the utility of the data, we can preserve
the utility and even slightly improve it, on average, as the AAE shapes data such
that an activity recognition classifier can learn better from the transformed data
than from the raw data.
To measure the privacy loss, we assume that an adversary has access to the
training dataset and we measure the ability of a pre-trained deep classifier on users
raw data in inferring the identity of the users when it receives the transformed
data. We train a classifier in the Trial setting over raw data and then feed it
different types of transformed data. The third row of Table 8 (ID) shows that
downsampling data from 50Hz to 5Hz reveals more information than using the
AAE output in the original frequency. These results show that the AAE can
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Table 8: Trade-off between utility (activity recognition) and privacy (protecting identity). The
forth row shows the K-NN rank between 24 users (the lower the better). Key – ACT : activity
recognition, ID : identity recognition, ACC : accuracy, F1 : F1 − score, DTW : Dynamic Time
Warping as similarity measure, SSA: Singular Spectrum Analysis, AAE : Our method.
Experiment Measure Raw Data Resampling SSA [13] AAE
50Hz 10Hz 5Hz 1+2 1 50Hz 50Hz
ACT
mean F1 92.5 91.1 88.0 88.6 87.4 91.5 92.9
xiance F1 2.1 0.6 1.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.37
ID
mean ACC 96.2 31.1 13.5 34.1 16.1 15.9 7.0
mean F1 95.9 25.6 8.9 28.6 12.6 11.2 1.8
DTW
mean Rank 0 7.2 9.3 6.8 9.5 10.7 6.6
variance Rank 0 5.7 5.8 5.6 5.4 5.5 4.7
effectively obscure user-identifiable information so that even a model that has had
access to the original data of the users cannot distinguish them after applying
the transformation.
Finally, to evaluate the privacy loss and efficiency of the anonymization with
an unsupervised mechanism, we implement the k-Nearest Neighbors (k-NN) with
Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) [47]. Using DTW, we measure the similarity
between the transformed data of a target user k and the raw data of each user
l, Xl, for all l ∈ {1, . . . , k, . . . , N}. Then we use this similarity measure to find
the k nearest neighbors of user l and check their rank. The last row of Table 8
(DTW) shows that it is very difficult to find similarities between the transformed
and raw data of the users as the performance of the AAE is very similar to the
baseline methods and the constraint in Eq. (5) maintain the data as similar as
possible to the original data. This result shows that the utility-privacy trade-off
of AAE is preferable to that of the other methods.
4.3. Compound Architecture
Here, we evaluate a setting where anonymization with the AEE follows re-
placement using RAE. Considering MotionSense dataset, we want an app to be
unable to infer gender or jogging activity from motion data. Let S={jogging}
be the sensitive activity to be replaced with N={standing still} as the neutral
activity. We also consider R ={walking, stairs-down, stairs-up} as the required
inferences. Let the time-window be 2.56 seconds (W = 128 samples) and M = 2,
i.e. we consider the magnitude of rotation and acceleration of the device.
First, we train two convolutional neural networks as activity and gender clas-
sifiers on the original training dataset. Second, RAE is trained to replace the
jogging time-windows while keeping the required time-windows unmodified in the
RAE’s output, X′. Third, we use the RAE’s output, X′, as the AAE’s input and
train the AEE to reduce the likelihood of the user’s gender being inferred from
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Table 9: True-positive rate for each activity and gender classification accuracy (%) using a
convolutional neural network for each stage of the compound model on MotionSense [43] dataset.
Inference X: Original X′: Replacement X′′: Anonymization
βi = βa = βd βi =
1
2
βa = βd
stairs-down 98.0 93.9 98.5 96.3
R stairs-up 96.4 97.8 92.3 96.3
walking 99.7 94.8 89.4 94.8
S jogging 99.3 1.4 (92 as N ) .2 (92 as N ) .1 (84 as N )
N standing 99.9 99.9 100 99.9
Gender 98.9 97.1 45.0 39.0
the ultimate data that is shared with the app, X′′. Finally, after training both
autoencoders, we feed the testing dataset into the compound model.
Table 9 shows the activity and gender classification results at each process-
ing stage. While X is highly informative for all inferences, after replacement
jogging intervals are not inferred in X′ and they are classified as standing. How-
ever, gender can still be inferred from X′. Inferring gender from X′′ (i.e. after
anonymization) reaches the desired level of random guess while the inference of
R is maintained close to the original accuracy. Importantly, the proposed frame-
work allows us to give different weights on preserving the activity and hiding
gender: the last column of Table 9 shows that a better accuracy can be obtained
if we increase the risk of leaking more sensitive information. Notice that, the
random guess is 50% accurate. Thus, the privacy loss is larger when we have
39% accuracy for gender classifier than 45%.
5. Discussion
While we believe the proposed mechanisms establish effective utility-privacy
trade-offs for sensor data transformations, here we discuss directions of this work
that need more explorations.
First, in the available datasets, the activities/gestures that are categorized
into sensitive, required, and neutral are independent of each other and at each
time-window only one of them is happening. However, in the real-world situa-
tions there might be correlations among different activities that affect the pro-
vided privacy guarantees for some sensitive inferences. Similarly, correlations
among consecutive time-windows of a specific activity may incrementally reveal
information that facilitate user re-identification. To assess this, we would need
access to multi-labelled data collected over a much longer time period as well as
a large number of demographically different users.
Second, to show that the proposed mechanisms can generalize, we performed
evaluations on several datasets collected from different type of sensors located
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in different part of users’ body. Current public datasets of mobile and wearable
sensor data do not simultaneously satisfy the requirements of abundance and
variety of activities and users. To reduce the risk of overfitting, we performed our
experiments on DNNs with small number of layers and small number of neurons
in each layer. With larger datasets, one can increase the learning capacity of
the RAE and AAE by adding more layers to the neural network or investigate
various DNN architectures.
Third, we have assumed the existence of a publicly available dataset to train
the RAE and the AAE. when such public dataset is not available, one option is
to use privacy-preserving model training without collecting personal data [48], or
training the required model through a federated learning [49].
Finally, we aim to investigate a privacy-preserving mechanism that trans-
forms sensitive patterns into a mixture of neutral activities rather than only one
of them. Moreover, we aim to look for, or to collect, larger datasets to conduct
experiments on additional tasks, to derive statistical bounds for the amount of
privacy achieved, and to measure the cost of running the proposed local trans-
formations on user devices.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we showed how to achieve a trade-off between privacy and util-
ity for sensor data release with an appropriate learning process. In particular,
we presented new ways to train deep autoencoders for continuous data trans-
formations to prevent a honest-but-curious app from discovering users’ sensitive
information. Our model is general and can be applied to unseen data of new
users, without need for re-training. Experiments conducted on various types of
real-world sensor data showed that our transformation mechanism eliminates the
possibility of making sensitive inferences and obscures user-specific motion pat-
terns that enable user re-identification, introducing a small utility loss for activity
and gesture recognition tasks.
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